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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial on two felony counts and two misdemeanor counts, the jury found
Geoffrey Claude Coleman guilty of misdemeanor exhibition of a deadly weapon. Mr. Coleman
appealed, asserting the district court erred when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 (Rule 29)
motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count. He
asserted the State did not present competent evidence that he exhibited a deadly weapon in the
presence of two or more persons, as required by the applicable statute, I.C. § 18-3303.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues the district court did not err when it denied
Mr. Coleman’s Rule 29 motion. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-13.) Specifically, the State contends that
Mr. Coleman “was necessarily in the presence of two persons—himself and his father—when he
brandished the gun. Ample evidence therefore sustained a charge of exhibiting a deadly weapon,
as the district court correctly found.” (Resp. Br., p.7.) Alternatively, the State argues that “even
if this Court finds it ambiguous whether ‘two (2) or more persons’ includes the defendant,
principles of [statutory] construction support a conclusion that it does.” (Resp. Br., p.10.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to show the State, by arguing Mr. Coleman was “in the
presence of . . . himself,” ignores the plain meaning of the words in section 18-3303. Thus, the
State’s argument is contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions on statutory interpretation.
This Reply Brief is also necessary to address the State’s argument that, assuming
section 18-3303 is ambiguous, the statute should be construed to apply to Mr. Coleman’s
conduct. Mr. Coleman asserts section 18-3303 is not ambiguous. If the Court decides section
18-3303 is ambiguous, the Court should interpret the statute as applying only where a defendant
draws or exhibits a deadly weapon in the presence of two persons, other than the defendant.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Coleman’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Coleman’s Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Coleman’s Idaho Criminal Rule 29 Motion For A
Judgment Of Acquittal Regarding The Exhibition Of A Deadly Weapon Count

A.

Introduction
Mr. Coleman asserts the district court erred when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 29

motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count. The State
did not present competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited the pistol in the presence of two
or more persons, as required by the plain language of I.C. § 18-3303. Thus, the district court
erred when it denied Mr. Coleman’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

B.

The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-3303 Does Not Support The State’s Interpretation Of
The Statute
Mr. Coleman asserts the plain language of I.C. § 18-3303 does not support the State’s

interpretation of the statute. When the district court denied Mr. Coleman’s Rule 29 motion, it
determined that under section 18-3303, “two or more persons can include the person with the
weapon, and there has to be at least one other person.” (See Tr. Vol. I, p.195, Ls.10-13.)
Similarly, the State argues that “the meaning of ‘two (2) or more persons’ is plain,” and
Mr. Coleman “was necessarily in the presence of two persons—himself and his father—when he
brandished the gun. Ample evidence therefore sustained a charge of exhibiting a deadly weapon,
as the district court correctly found.” (Resp. Br., p.7.) However, this argument ignores the plain
meaning of the words in section 18-3303.

Thus, the State’s argument is contrary to the

Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions on statutory interpretation.
Section 18-3303 provides that “[e]very person who, not in necessary self-defense, in the
presence of two (2) or more persons, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon in a rude, angry and

4

threatening manner, or who, in any manner, unlawfully uses the same, in any fight or quarrel, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.” I.C. § 18-3303. As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[t]he
interpretation of a statute ‘must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.’”
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz,
139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003)).
The State, by arguing Mr. Coleman was in the presence of himself, ignores the plain
meaning of the words in section 18-3303. In its attempt to discern the plain meaning, the State
relies upon the definitions of “presence” from Black’s Law Dictionary. (See Resp. Br., p.7.)
The entry from Black’s Law Dictionary, including example sentences, defines “presence” as:
“1. The quality, state, or condition of being in a particular time and place, particularly with
reference to some act that was done then and there <his presence at the scene saved two lives>”;
and “2. Close physical proximity coupled with awareness <the agent was in the presence of the
principal>.” Presence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
The example sentences from Black’s Law Dictionary indicate section 18-3303 uses the
second definition of “presence,” namely, “[c]lose physical proximity coupled with awareness.”
Compare id. (“<the agent was in the presence of the principal>”), with I.C. § 18-3303 (“[e]very
person who . . . in the presence of two (2) or more persons . . . .”). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “proximity” as “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being near in time, place, order, or
relation.” Proximity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Definitions from other dictionaries of the phrase, “in the presence of someone,” also shed
light on the plain meaning of the words in section 18-3303. See In Someone’s Presence,
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/in-
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someones-presence (last accessed December 21, 2017) (“If you are in someone’s presence, you
are in the same place as that person, and are close enough to them to be seen or heard. The talks
took place in the presence of a diplomatic observer.”); In the Presence of Somebody, LONGMAN
DICTIONARY

OF

CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH, https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/in-the-

presence-of-somebody (last accessed December 21, 2017) (“(also in somebody’s presence)
formal with someone or in the same place as them”).
In view of the definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, under the plain meaning of the
words in section 18-3303, the prohibited act is a defendant drawing or exhibiting a deadly
weapon in close physical proximity to two persons, i.e., near in place to two persons. See
Presence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY; Proximity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. The definitions
from the Collins and Longman dictionaries likewise show the statute prohibits a defendant from
drawing or exhibiting a deadly weapon with two persons, or in the same place as two persons.
The above definitions together establish that, at least in everyday use of the English
language, it is not said that a person is in the presence of himself or herself. It is not said that a
person is in close physical proximity, or near in place, to herself; nor is it said that a person is
with himself, or in the same place as himself. Thus, the act prohibited by section 18-3303 would
occur when a defendant exhibits a deadly weapon in the presence of two or more persons, other
than the defendant. Under the “plain, usual, and ordinary meaning” of the words in the statute, it
cannot be said that Mr. Coleman was in the presence of himself. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 894.
By arguing that Mr. Coleman was “in the presence of . . . himself” (see Resp. Br., p.7),
the State contends Mr. Coleman was in close physical proximity, or near in place, to himself.
The State also thereby argues Mr. Coleman was with himself, or in the same place as himself.
As shown by the above dictionary definitions, the State’s argument does not reflect everyday use
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of the words in section 18-3303. The State’s interpretation is contrary to Verska and its directive
to give the words in a statute their “plain, usual, and ordinary meaning.” See Verska, 151 Idaho
at 894. The State ignores the plain meaning of the words in section 18-3303. Thus, the State’s
argument is contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions on statutory interpretation. 1
The plain language of section 18-3303 does not support the State’s (and district court’s)
interpretation that the defendant may count as one of the two persons for the presence of two or
more persons element of exhibition of a deadly weapon. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. Under
the plain language of the statute, two persons other than the defendant must be present.
I.C. § 18-3303. But the State, as discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., p.8), did not
present competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited the pistol in the presence of two or more
persons.

The evidence presented by the State was therefore insufficient to sustain

Mr. Coleman’s conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon.

1

For the Court’s information, in an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected an
argument on the statutory interpretation of I.C. § 18-3303 that was substantially similar to the
State’s argument here. State v. Arroyo, No. 29484, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 404 (Idaho
Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2005).
In Arroyo, regarding an aggravated assault charge, the district court refused the
defendant’s request that it instruct the jury on exhibition of a deadly weapon as a lesser included
offense. Id. at 2-3. While it was “uncontested that the only persons present at the time in
question were the victim” and the defendant, on appeal the defendant asserted “that he counts as
one of the two persons.” See id. at 3. In response, the State argued, “[i]t makes little or no
linguistic sense, however, to believe that an act is committed in the presence of a person if the
actor is alone, and it makes no more sense that an actor doing an act with only he and one other
present has done the act ‘in the presence of two or more persons.’” Respondent’s Brief at 9,
State v. Arroyo, No. 29484 (Sept. 16, 2014).
The Court of Appeals held the “argument that section 18-3303 could be applied here is
untenable,” and found no ambiguity in the statute. Arroyo, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 404,
at 3. The Arroyo Court noted that taking the defendant’s “position to its logical extension would
mean that a defendant can be held to have committed an act in the presence of a person if the
actor is alone.” Id.
7

C.

I.C. § 18-3303 Is Not Ambiguous, But If This Court Decides It Is Ambiguous, The Court
Should Interpret The Statute As Applying Where A Defendant Draws Or Exhibits A
Deadly Weapon In The Presence Of Two Persons, Other Than The Defendant
In the alternative, the State argues that “even if this Court finds it ambiguous whether

‘two (2) or more persons’ includes the defendant, principles of construction support a conclusion
that it does.” (Resp. Br., p.10.) Mr. Coleman asserts I.C. § 18-3303 is not ambiguous. If this
Court decides section 18-3303 is ambiguous, Mr. Coleman asserts the Court should interpret the
statute as applying where a defendant draws or exhibits a deadly weapon in the presence of two
persons, other than the defendant.

1.

Section 18-3303 Is Not Ambiguous

Mr. Coleman asserts section 18-3303 is not ambiguous. As the Idaho Supreme Court has
held, “[a] statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction.” State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 379 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is only one reasonable construction of Section 18-3303—Mr. Coleman’s
construction, which follows the plain language of the statute.
The State has not shown that section 18-3303 is ambiguous. The State’s construction,
which ignores the plain meaning of the words in the statute, is not reasonable. A statute is
ambiguous where its meaning “is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be
uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155
Idaho 853, 856 (2014) (quoting BHA Invs., Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 358 (2003)).
“However, ambiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are
presented to a court.” Id. (quoting BHA Invs., Inc., 138 Idaho at 358). Further, a statute “is not
ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it.” Id.
(quoting BHA Invs., Inc., 138 Idaho at 358).
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As shown above, the State’s interpretation of section 18-3303 does not reflect everyday
use of the words in the statute, and does not give the words in the statute their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning. The State’s interpretation, that Mr. Coleman was in the presence of himself
(see Resp. Br., p.7), i.e., near in place to himself or with himself, is not reasonable.
The meaning of the words in section 18-3303 is not so doubtful or obscure that
reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. See Farmers Nat’l Bank, 155
Idaho at 856.

The language of the statute is not capable of more than one reasonable

construction. See Olivas, 158 Idaho at 379. Thus, section 18-3303 is not ambiguous.2

2.

If This Court Decides Section 18-3303 Is Ambiguous, The Court Should Interpret
The Statute As Applying Where A Defendant Draws Or Exhibits A Deadly
Weapon In The Presence Of Two Persons, Other Than The Defendant

If this Court decides that section 18-3303 is ambiguous, Mr. Coleman asserts the Court
should interpret the statute as applying where a defendant draws or exhibits a deadly weapon in
the presence of two persons, other than the defendant. If a statute is ambiguous, “then it must be
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean.” Olivas, 158 Idaho at 379
(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[w]e determine

legislative intent by examining not only the literal words of the statute, but also the
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the event this Court decides that section 18-3303 is ambiguous, the Court should
interpret the statute as applying where a defendant draws or exhibits a deadly weapon in the
presence of two persons, other than the defendant. The State argues that the Idaho Legislature
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did not mean to exclude the defendant from the phrase “two (2) or more persons” in section 183303, because the Legislature did not write “another person” or “other person” in the statute.
(See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) However, former I.C. § 18-3302, enacted alongside section 18-3303,
indicates otherwise. See 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 336, § 1, p.911. Former section 18-3302
provided that “[i]f any person . . . shall, in the presence of one (1) or more persons, exhibit any
deadly or dangerous weapon in a rude, angry, or threatening manner . . . he shall, upon
conviction,” be guilty of a misdemeanor. 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 336, § 1, p.911; see
State v. McNary, 100 Idaho 244, 246 n.1 (1979).
By arguing section 18-3303 includes the defendant in the phrase “two (2) or more
persons,” the State contends only one other person need be present when a defendant draws or
exhibits a deadly weapon. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) But if the Legislature had intended to
cover such an act with section 18-3303, it would have used the language it used in former
section 18-3302, which only required the defendant be “in the presence of one (1) or more
persons.” Otherwise, following the State’s interpretation, former section 18-3302 would have
criminalized a person exhibiting a deadly or dangerous weapon while completely alone. That
would not be a reasonable construction of these statutes.
By covering situations where a person exhibited a deadly or dangerous weapon in the
presence of one other person, former section 18-3302 meant enacting section 18-3303 with
Mr. Coleman’s interpretation in mind would not, despite the State’s arguments, have given
defendants “free reign to angrily exhibit a gun to another individual.” (See Resp. Br., p.11.)
Further, that the Legislature ultimately repealed former section 18-3302 in 1990, see 1990 Idaho

2

For the Court’s information, when the Idaho Court of Appeals in Arroyo held section 18-3303
was not ambiguous, it observed, “[t]he absence of the word ‘other’ before ‘persons’ does not
make the statute ambiguous.” Arroyo, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 404, at 3.
10

Sess. Laws, ch. 256, § 1, p.732, does not suggest Mr. Coleman’s interpretation of section 183303 would, as the State claims, “incentivize[] threatening displays of deadly weapons, just as
long as they occur in private, and one-on-one.” (See Resp. Br., p.11.) Rather, such one-on-one
exhibitions of a deadly weapon could conceivably be charged as simple assault, see I.C. § 18901, or aggravated assault, see I.C. §§ 18-901 & 18-905, or disturbing the peace, see I.C. § 186409(1).
Thus, in light of the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind
the statute, and its legislative history, see Olivas, 158 Idaho at 379, if this Court decides
section 18-3303 is ambiguous, the Court should interpret the statute as applying where a
defendant draws or exhibits a deadly weapon in the presence of two persons, other than
the defendant.
In sum, the plain language of I.C. § 18-3303 does not support an interpretation that the
defendant may count as one of the two persons for the presence of two or more persons element
of exhibition of a deadly weapon. Under the plain language of the statute, two persons other
than the defendant must be present. Section 18-3303 is not ambiguous. Even if section 18-3303
is ambiguous, the statute should be interpreted to exclude circumstances where a person draws or
exhibits a deadly weapon with only one other person present. Here, the State did not present
competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited the pistol in the presence of two or more
persons. Thus, the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to sustain Mr. Coleman’s
conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Coleman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s Judgment, because
the State did not present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for exhibition of a
deadly weapon.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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